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ABSTRACT 
Many neoclassical economists hold that relative income ine-
quality increases during the early stages of economic growth before ulti-
mately decreasing as the later periods of growth are reached (the 
divergence-convergence hypothesis). The early phase of divergence has a 
parallel in Marx' writings. The present article uses recent empirical 
evidence to show that such a pattern cannot be affirmed as a general histo-
rical phenomenon and that variations in income levels explain very little 
of the present variation in inequality among countries. The analysis shows 
that other patterns occur as countries develop, and that institutional 
structures and government policies rather than per capita income are the 
chief determinants of inequality. 
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"Income Inequality and Economic Growth: 
Examining the Evidence" * 
Introduction 
ThP. relationship of income distribution to economic growth is a topic 
of increasing concern to economists and economic planners. Conventional 
analysis holds that the distribution of income worsens during the earlier 
stages of economic growth, then improves as a country reaches the latter 
growth stages (the divergence - convergence hypothesis). Increased savings 
by the wealthy underlie the initial worsening of the distribution. They 
are, however, the engine of growth, so that a "growth versus equity" issue 
emerges. 
Recently several scholars have challenged the prevailing view. 
Chase-Dunn analyzes the structure of international relations as an influence 
1 
on levels of inequality. Fishlow cites government policy, rather than in-
come levels, as the major source of Brazil's worsening income distribution 
2 
during the 1960's. Cline, Lopes and Figueroa find that the poor would be 
better off with a more equal income distribution even over a long time period 
3 
with a reduction in growth rates. Adelman md Morris do not find income levels 
4 
to be an important determinant of inequality. Reynolds suggests that the 
distribution question often involves the ability of different economic grou~s 
5 
to obtain economic rents. 
* The author wishes to thank the following individuals for comments and criticism 
of earlier drafts: Francis Walker, Richard Meyer, Douglas Graham, David Hansen, 
Dale Adams, William Flinn, Rodolfo Hoffmann and John Reeder. The opinions and 
any remaining errors are of course the author's. 
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The present article complements and extends the above arguments. 
It critically reexamines the data and arguments used by proponents of the 
divergence - convergence hypothesis. For the first time, the key statements 
on the topic are systematically developed as formal propositions subject to 
logical analysis (and often statistical tests). This approach reveals that 
the existence of a divergence - convergence pattern of growth and inequality 
eannot be affirmed as a general historical phenomenon, and that variations in 
income levels explain very little of the current variation in inequality among 
countries. The poor performance of the hypothesis indicates the need to 
study alternative explanations for (and patterns of) income inequality, some 
of which are suggested in the text. 
The Divergence - Convergence Hypothesis in 
Neoclassical and Marxian Economics 
The divergence - convergence hypothesis in neoclassical economics dates 
from Simon Kuznets' Presidential Address to the American Economic Association 
6 
in 1954. He stated as a conjecture that income inequality increases in the 
early stages of economic development, stabilizes at some peak level, then de-
creases as the latter stages of development are reached. Kuznets saw this as 
a secular historical phenomenon in which the initial worsening of the distri-
bution of income is associated with rapid early industrial growth. The his-
torical starting point is an agrarian or pre-industrial state where incomes 
are too low to permit substantial inequality. As technical change and indus-
trialization increase national wealth, earning differentials emerge as a 
consequence of structural changes in the economy. Since only the upper 
' 
' 
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percentiles of recipients save, the resulting concentration of assets and 
7 
investments among the rich leads to increasing income inequality. 
There are a number of similarities between the Kuznets' analysis 
and Marx' interpretation of the growth process. Marx termed savings "sur-
plus" and conceived of the surplus as the engine of economic growth. Im-
proved technology increased the surplus and transformed the basis of society 
from primitive connnunism through successive stages of slavery, feudalism 
8 
and ~apitalism. The expropriation of the ever-growing surplus by an 
elite led to the increasing concentration of income, continuation of sub-
sistence wages for workers and the creation of an army of unemployed. In 
the final phases of capitalism, the skewness would become so pronounced as 
to precipitate a "realization crisis" and the collapse of the capitalist 
system. 
While both Kuznets and Marx envisioned increasing income concentration 
as a natural outgrowth of economic development and savings (surplus) accumu-
lation, Kuznets reasoned that concentration would stabilize at some peak level 
and then gradually decline with continued economic growth, due to demographic 
changes, the dynamics of growth (mortality of entrepreneurs and industries), 
9 
the increasing importance of service income and political intervention. 
Marx, in contrast, envisioned the abolition of property after the peak of 
inequality had been reached, and thus most income inequality would be elimi-
nated upon the collapse of the capitalistic system. 
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Although dualistic growth models largely neglect questions of income 
distribution, the shift from agriculture to industry is entirely consistent 
with the development of earnings differentials and increasing inequality in 
10 
the early stages of development. Therefore, the tendency among both neo-
classical and Marxist economists has been to refine and extend rather than 
challenge the divergence - convergence hypothesis. 
A schematic presentation of the view of both schools is given in 
Figure 1. In both cases, the relation between inequality and per capita 
income is seen as an inverted 'U'. 
Measures of Inequality 
Xany data problems exist in the calculation of income distribution 
statistics, and there is a degree of arbitrariness in the selection of 
11 
indices. This article, however, questions the analysis and conclusions 
of proponents of the inverted 'U' hypothesis rather than the estimates 
contained in their data sets, which are accepted as presented. 
In order to make the analysis comparable with that of the studies 
reviewed in this paper, two measures of income inequality are used: the 
Gini index and the income shares of given percentiles of income recipients. 
The Gini index is a measure of the overall inequality of the distribution 
of income. Its theoretical value ranges from zero (when all recipients 
would obtain exactly the same income) to unity (when one recipient would 
receive all the income). 
' 
' 
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Atkinson has argued for the use of a weighted index to explicitly assign 
a welfare weight to a given group of recipients, such as the poorest 20% of 
12 
recipients. This paper, however, uses the income share of percentiles of 
recipients as a direct measure of the relative welfare of the income groups 
analyzed. This achieves the same result as the weighted index while retaining 
comparability with previous studies (including historical data from which 
neither the Gini nor weighted indices may be calculated). 
Evidence ~ the Hypothesis and Related Propositions 
In his 1954 address, Kuznets emphasized the tentative nature of his 
analysis and the need for "additional evidence that might lead to reformu-
13 
lation and revisions." The first phase of the search for additional evi-
dence probably terminated with the publication of Felix Paukert's unified 
and corrected list of previously scattered statistics on income distribution 
14 
and income levels. Paukert, however, did not oerceive the potential for 
radical reformulation of the hypothesis which the data !)rovided, usine; them 
instead to refine and extend the divergence - convergence hypothesis. He 
concluded that the evidence supported the hypothesis as well as a series of 
related propositions. 
Chenery ~ al. and Adelman and Morris appear to accept the hypothesis 
without considering income levels to be an important determinant of inequality, 
15 
a point challenged by Paukert. Lecaillon and Germidis, along with Langoni, 
accept Paukert's analysis as definitive and as a valid basis for policy recom-
16 
mendations. 
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The impressive list of statistics presented by Paukert consists of 
historical data (estimates of income inequality within given countries over 
time), and cross-country comparisons of income inequality and Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) per capita for 56 countries cerca 1965. The time series in-
fol'ID8tion provides little evidence that the inverted 'U' pattern characterized 
the historical experience of currently developed areas. Conspicuously absent 
from the estimates is evidence of a phase of increasing inequality in the 
early phases of economic growth and industrialization (there is one clear 
exception - Prussia - and a possible exception - Saxony). 
In Great Britain and Norway, income shares show a long term trend 
towards equality, with some evidence of recent reversals. Attempts to 
estimate inequality for Great Britain as far back as 1436 reveal no 
period of increasing skewness. Income shares indicate a general trend 
toward equality for Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden.17 Gini 
indices for males in eight Norwegian cities declined steadily from the 
mid-l~OO's on. 
Gini coefficients for recent decades on the United States and 
India, countries at radically different levels of development, present 
a slight trend towards equality. The inverted 'U' hypothesis would 
predict an increase in inequality for India due to its per capita income 
level (as specified by Paukert and reproduced herein as Figure 2). For 
Mexico, Argentina and Puerto Rico, there was an apparent worsening of the 
Gini indices during the 1950's, although their per capita income positions 
would place them on the declining side of the parabola of skewness (Table 1 
and Figure 2). 
' 
' 
' 
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Paukert notes that the historical data is open to conflicting inter-
pretation and rests his argument in support of the hypothesis 
on the cross-sectional data. He justifies the use of international com-
parisons of distribution of income by size as "a generally accepted 
procedure and one which is to some extent forced on us by the scarcity 
18 
and quality of historical data." This analysis rests on the premise 
that changes in income distributions in the course of economic growth 
can also be traced "by comparing income distributions in countries at 
19 
different levels of development." 
As Adelman and Morris observe, there is no statistical justification 
20 
for interpreting a cross-section as representative of changes over time. 
An equally serious problem is the implicit assumption that the less 
developed countries (LDCs) are characterized by the same conditions as 
found in the current developed countries (DCs) at the start of their 
industrial development. There is no reason to suppose that the experience 
21 
of the DCs will merely repeat itself in the LDCs with a time lag. Even 
if one accepts these assumptions, however, Paukert's cross-sectional 
estimates do not support several of his conclusions. The figures on 
GDP per capita and Gini ratios which he cites in support of the inverted 
'U' hypothesis are reproduced in Table 1. His statistical treatment of 
the data is limiteu to calculating the mean Gini ratio and GDP/capita 
for seven income groups, plotting the points and connecting them with 
line segments (yielding Figure 2), Paukert's conclusions from this 
22 
exercise are quoted as Proposition 1: 
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"There is a sharp increase in inequality as one moves 
from countries in the lowest income group to those in 
the $101-200 group, and a further but less pronounced 
increase as one moves on to the $201-300 group. This 
group and the next $301-500) represent the peak of 
inequality. There is then a substantial reduction in 
inequality in the $501-1,000 group, whose general 
level of inequality corresponds to that of the lowest 
income group (under $100). As one moves further 
along the developed path, to the $1,001-2,000 and to 
the above $2,000 groups, there is a clear reduction 
in the extent of inequality." 
Lecaillon and Germidis integrate these conclusions into their work 
on the wage share, adding that $250 marks the Gini ratio peak, with a 
23 
sharp decline coming <?.ft er $500. - Langoni states that for the early 
stages of development, Paukert's data provide "irrefutable empirical 
evidence (that) increasing inequality is an inevitable consequence of 
24 
economic development." Langoni also asserts that the declining phase 
of inequality found at higher income levels proves that income inequality 
will "automatically" correct itself as the country becomes richer. There-
fore, the cure for inequality is not legislation but accelerated economic 
growth, so that a country reaches the declining side of the parabola of 
25 
skewness as quickly as possible. 
None of these conclusions is warranted by the cross-sectional estimates. 
In order to obtain the artificial parabola of Figure 2, one must ignore 
the predominant feature of the observations on inequality, that is, 
their tremendous dispersion at all income levels. This is immediately 
' 
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apparent when the actual observations of Table 1 are graphed (Figure 3). 
Both visual and statistical analysis of the data question the significance 
of the relationship hypothesized in Proposition 1 and Figure 2. 
Da Silva has made a statistical test on the proposition usin~ a mul-
tiple linear regression model for Paukert's data, with dunnny variables to 
represent the suggested changes in slope upon passing from one income. group 
26 2 
to the next. The R is only 0.19 and none of the slope coefficient estimates 
arE! significantly different from zero at the 20% level, results which offer 
no support for the relations of Proposition 1 and Fi~re 2. 
Other tests on the non-linearity of the relationshfo between the Gini 
index and GDP per capita include ouadratic and lo~arithmic functions. Both 
~ types of regression contain inacceptable levels of multicolinearity and not 
surprisingly lead to conflicting interpretations (see appendix). In all cases, 
the adjusted coefficient of determination is less than 0.20, indicating that 
over 80% of the variation in inequality among countries is "unexplained" by 
the variation in income per capita. 
Two Related Hypotheses 
Some researchers have used income shares as evidence in favor of the 
following two hypotheses: 1) the income shares of the lower quintiles 
of recipients follow a 'U' pattern as per capita income increases; and 
2) the share of the richest percentiles exhibits an inverted 'U' pattern 
as per capita income increases. Together, these statements are little 
more than a restatement of the divergence - convergence hypothesis. They 
need to be discussed separately, however, due to their theoretical 
' 
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relevance to the inequality issue and because they have been explicitly 
accepted by prominent researchers. 
Adelman and Morris affirm that plotting the means of groups of 
countries with increasing levels of income against the income shares of 
the poorest 60% of recipients "yields an almost perfectly U-shaped relation-
ship." Ahluwalia finds a significant 'U' relationship between the share 
of the lowest 40% of recipients and income and an inverted 'U' for the 
27 
highest 20% of recipients. 
:'he analysis of these propositions yields results similar to those of 
the previous section where Gini ratios were used. Figure 4 shows the 
tremendous dispersion of the income shares of the lowest 60% of recipients. 
The group means and the ranges of the shares of both the lowest 60% and 
highest 20% of recipients are given in Table 2 (a discussion of statis-
tical tests of the propositions is given in the appendix}. Variations in 
income levels are associated with even less of the variation in income 
shares of the rich and poor than with the variation in Gini indices. 
The Income Share of the Very Poor 
The hypothesized 'U' pattern of the income share of the poor with 
economic growth deserves some additional comment due to the extensive 
discussion of "subsistence levels" of income in the literature on economic 
development, dating from the "Iron Law of Wages." 
Kuznets, Paukert and others have reasoned that the rising inequality 
hypothesized for the early stages of economic growth is associated with 
extreme poverty among the lower quintiles of recipients in the poorest 
29 
nations. In Paukert's words: 
28 
' 
' 
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",The data) confirm Kuznets' hypothesis abcJt the share 
0f the lower income groups in total income. The share of 
the lowest 20 per cent can be expected to be higher in 
the countries with the lowest per capita income, given 
a subsistence minimum which of course forms a higher 
percentage of average income there than elsewhere." 
If a "subsistence minimum" could be defined in terms of per capita 
income, this would be a tautology, not a hypothesis. If the subsistence 
minimum were, for example, 61 dollars per capita and a country's per capita 
income also $61, there could be no inequality, since any recipients of 
$60 or less would perish. The lowest.20% of recipients would earn the 
maximum share possible for their quintile: 20% of the national income. 
There is, however, no meaningful definition of "subsistence level" 
in a per capita dollar equivalent. The share of the poorest 20% of 
recipients varies widely even within the poorest nations (Table 3). 
The lowest quintile has 10% of income in Burma (GDP per capita= $64), 
4.8% in Tanzania (GDP • $61) and only 3.9% in Madagascar (GDP per capita • 
$92). Very low per capita incomes may imply short life spans and human 
suffering, but reveal little about the shares of national income. 
This fact helps explain why the explanatory power of the inverted 
'U' hypothesis is so low. Political intervention (in the form of tax 
laws, property rights, role of government in the economy etc.) is present 
in all countries at all levels of economic growth. It does not appear 
only after high levels of income per capita are attained, as implied by 
Kuznets (Figure 1). Political intervention may worsen as well as 
improve income distribution. This is why the pre-industrial stage 
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of devalopment (agrarianism or primitive communism) is not characterized 
3{) 
by low inequality. A high degree of skewness is common among poor 
nations (Figures 3 and 4). For those countries, further increases in 
skewness with economic growth must be at least partially ascribed to 
institutional and policy measures favoring concentration of income among 
the wealthy. 
Some Additional Propositions 
Paukert's cross-sectional estimates allow confirmation of a more 
modest hypothesis than those discussed above. Defining the DCs as the 
13 countries with per capita income over $1,000 and LDCs as the other 
43 (Table 1), Paukert states that there is "greater income equality" 
31 
in developed countries than in developing countries •. 
expressed as: 
Proposition 2: 
H : µ Gini LDCs = µ Gini DCs 
0 
H1 : µ Gini LDCs > µ Gini DCs 
This is formally 
Ctatistical tests support this hypothesis. It should, however, be 
amended to read "the average level of income inequality is higher in 
LDCs than in DCs and subject to even greater variation." 32 
A final statement by Paukert is of relevance for policy decisions 
33 
on redistribution: 
Proposition 3: 
"The greater inequality in developing countries is due 
primarily to the high share of income received by the 
richest 5% of the population (rather than the share of 
the richest 20%)." 
' 
' 
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This proposition cannot be statistically tested for the cross-
sectional data of Table 1, since it would require the regression of the 
Gini index on the percentile shares used in its calculation. However, one 
can assess its applicability for an individual country by examining the 
relativ~ shares of income. For example, in Peru (Gini = 0.61) the 
top 5% of income earners received 48.3% of the national income, against 
~· 
only 19.3% for the next 15% of recipients. The figures for South A~rica 
(Gini = 0.58) were 39.4% and 18.0%. In both cases, recipients in the 80th 
to 95th percentiles received a percentage of income only slightly higher 
than their percentage weight in the population. 
In other countries, however, high Gini indices are due to a fairly 
uniform concentration among the top 20% of recipients. The top 5% of 
recipients in Morocco (Gini = 0.50) receive 20.6% of national income, with 
44.5% going to the next 15% of recipients. The figures for Tunisia (Gini = 
0.53) are 22.4% and 42.6%. In these two countries, the top 20% of recip-
ients obtain about 65% of the national product, compared with 68% for 
Peru and 57% for South Africa. 
Savings Ratios and Inequality 
As observed earlier, the neoclassical argument concerning increasing 
inequality in the early stages of growth rests heavily on the belief that 
the marginal propensities to save of the rich are greater than those of the 
poor. Kuznets even states that "in the underdeveloped countries savings 
could be realized only at the very peak of the income pyramid, say by 
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35 
the top 5 or 3 per cent." A common extension of this analysis associates 
increasing skewness with rapid economic growth. Kuznets (cited earlier) 
specifically associates rapid industrialization with increasing inequality. 
Johnson and Langoni are among the neoclassical authors warning against 
redistribution in LDCs, fearing it would lower savings and investment and 
36' 
thus slow growth. 
Marx' theory of economic development also depends on high propensities 
to save and invest on the part of the capitalist elite. The capitalists 
are driven by economic necessity to expropriate the economic surplus, 
accumulate and invest. Workers are impoverished and thus save nothing. 
The assumption that workers save nothing and capitalists save everything 
is a formal part of some neoclassical growth models, and Lecaillon and 
37 Germidis suggest it be considered when analyzing LDCs. 
An analysis of the savings (or economic surplus) argument provides 
additional explanations for the wide variation in inequality and growth 
rates among countries. First, the savings-growth argument rests on three 
questionable assumptions: 1) personal savings are the principal source of 
investment; 2) expenditures can be dicotomized into consumption and 
investment outlays; and 3) physical capital is the only constraint on 
growth. 
Possible differentials in the marginal propensities to save among 
individuals are less important to growth when government and corporations 
become the major savers and investors in the economy. Governments realize 
both savings and investment when they use taxes to improve the social 
' 
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and economic infrastructure. Government corporations, even in market 
economies, are often among the largest corporations in a developing country. 
In Brazil, for example, government corporations realize massive investment 
programs in oil exploration and refining, hydro-electric development, 
mining and industry. Eight of the ten largest non-financial corporations 
38 
in that country are state-sponsored enterprises. In Peru, almost 70% 
39 
of total saving is attributed to corporate and business savings. The 
implication is that the savings performance of a society may bear no close 
relation to the marginal propensities to save of its rich. 
Furthermore, the dichotomy between investment and consumption is 
arbitrary and especially so at low income levels. As a result, the savings 
potential and performance of the poor and lower middle classes may be 
severely underestimated. Since the poor allocate a high proportion of 
their expenditures to food, health care and other goods which directly 
improve their productive capacities, much of their consumption expendi-
tures should be classified as investments in human capital. 
This factor is of course related to the assumption that physical 
capital is the only constraint on growth. Human skills are equally scarce 
in LDCs. Seen in this light, broader access to income streams, universal 
literacy and availability of public health services (all related to greater 
income equality), promote economic development by assisting the development 
of a broad range of human skills. In contrast, low per capita income 
associated with a highly skewed income distribution implies that 
a large percentage of the population will suffer the effects of malnutri-
~ tion, illiteracy and ill health. While these individuals do not consume 
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a great deal of the society's production, they also contribute little 
to i.ts output and economic growth. 
Secondly, the allegation that only the upper percentiles of recipients 
save is factually incorrect. A more reasonable hypo.the.sis is that. sav-
ings behavior, like income distribution, is heavily influenc:ed by a 
country1 s political, financial and cultural environment. Lo:wer income 
groups in several c.ountries are impressive savers. Korea, Japan and 
Taiwan are examples of countries with very small farms, ''equitable" 
distributions of land holdings and amazing records of growth and productivity. 
Small farmer savings in these countries have resulted in high rates of 
capital formation in the agricultural sector while providing loanable 
funds for industrial growth over long time periods. In regions as 
diverse as the Indian Panjab, West Malaysia, Zambia and Ethiopia, house-
hold survey data reveal high average propensities to save among small-
41 
holders (frequently the APS's are in the 0.10 to 0.30 range). 
The divergence - convergence hypothesis and the savings differential 
arguments contain the political danger of self-fulfilling prophecies. 
If policy makers believe that the early stages of economic growth are 
naturally accompanied by increasing skewness and that efforts to reduce 
inequality merely slow growth, they are likely to maintain or adopt 
anti-egalitarian policies. Similarly, if policy makers believe the poor 
are incapable of saving, little emphasis will be placed on providing 
them with access to savings instruments with positive rates of return. 
Credit and interest restrictions combined with inflation will combine 
42. 
to produce little savings among the poor. 
Additional arguments advanced by neoclassical theorists concerning the 
hypothesis of increasing inequality during the early stages of economic 
40 
' 
' 
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43 
growth include structural shifts and economies of scale in the economy. 
Structural shifts from a simple agricultural society to an industrial 
society may produce substantial earning differentials due to varying mar-
ginal products of workers. The demand for special skills could create 
44 
monopoly rents for those who possess them. Similarly, the emergence 
of large scale enterprises could result in concentration of earnings 
among entrepreneurs. 
Once again, these propositions are based on certain idealized 
types of growth which do not reflect the experience of most LDCs. In 
particular, Table 1 reveals that societies often possess extremely 
skewed income distributions before any substantial industrialization has 
taken place. Whether subsequent industrialization results in increased 
inequality depends on specific economic and political strategies followed 
during industrialization. Earning differentials already exist, such as 
those based on land and asset ownership and among professionals and 
government workers. Earnings may not be closely related to marginal 
products, and it is not clear that increased complexity and division 
of labor would accentuate earnings differentials, even in the absence 
of redistributive policies. 
Similarly, large scale enterprise may not lead to increased inequality. 
Large enterprises may be government owned, subject to heavy taxation and 
other governmental intervention, or counterbalanced by strong unions. As 
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seen earlier, the DCs have lower levels of inequality than LDCs, even 
though large scale enterprise is more common in the de:veloped nation:s. 
If large scale enterprise is thought to increase skewnes·s in the size 
distribution of income· in LDCs, it is necessary to establish the el!:b-
tence of differential elements in the political and economic s.tructure 
of LDCs which allow this to occur. This is the focus of dependency 
theory, which analyzes the structure of international relations as an 
45 
influence on levels of inequality. 
Finally, economic growth rates, like savings ·ratios, are largely 
unrelated to inequality of income. Data on growth rates over short 
periods of time compiled by the World Bank either indicate no relation 
or a positive relation between the income share of the lowest 40% of 
46 
recipients and the rate of growth of GNP. Simulations of growth under 
redist~ibutive policies are in general favorable to the case for redis-
tribution even though they overestimate savings losses due to incomplete 
47 
consideration of the fcctors discussed in this section. 
Other Patterns of Growth and Inequality 
Among the many patterns which countries may exhibit in the course 
of their development are the following: 
1) "low-to-low" and "moderate-to-low". Some DCs, such as the 
United States, probably never had distributions as skewed 
as many of the LDCs in Table 1, due to widespread land and 
property ownership and relatively high wage scales in their 
early development; 
2) "L" patterns. The Soviet Union, China and other countries 
experienced extensive development after major property reallo-
cations; 
' 
' 
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3) "high-to-high". France has the most skewed distribution of 
the DCs in Table 1. If its distribution has not worsened 
over time, it belongs to this class. Some oil-rich nations 
might be placed in this class if development is defined 
only in terms of income per capita. 
Additionally, income distributions in many nations may fluctuate 
considerably in the course of their development. Great care should be 
exercised in interpreting these as part of a long-term pattern of 
inequality and development, or ascribing them to specific causes such 
as variations in the business cycle. It is also helpful to distinguish 
inequality in the size distribution of income from inequality among 
regions of a nation, The causes of regional inequality include scale 
economies, agglomeration economies and locational advantages (favorable 
location with respect to transportation and natural resources). There is 
no necessary relation between regional inequalities and inequalities of 
individual incomes. In fact, they may move in opposite directions. 
For example, in Brazil during the 1960's, regional inequalities decreased 
while individual income inequalities increased.48 
Selecting .!!!. Appropriate Hypothesis 
As I pointed out elsewhere, it is very difficult to refute a hypothesis 
49 
once it has been selected as the null (or working) hypothesis. Those who 
challenge conventional views are required to rresent overwhelming evidence on 
their behalf. A typical example is given by Pang, who adds Singapore (from 
1966 to 1973) to the list of countries experiencing substantial growth and 
50 
reduction in inequality of incomes. He observes that while the Singapore 
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experience "does not support the hypothesis of growing in-equality in developing 
countries, 11 neither does it refute the hypothesis. 
In this respect, it is well to make distinction between the fact that 
some countries do experience increased inequality during some phase of growth, 
and the unconfirmed hypotheses that this characterized the<development of 
current DCs or is "natural" or "inevitable" for d&veloping countries presently. 
Furthermore, a contrary (everr heretical) hypoit:hesis pro:ves more useful and 
enlightening. Assume that the 11naturaln tendency for a country in the course 
of its development is to combine growth with improvement in the relative 
distribution of income amon'g recipients. A !though percentil:e and Gini measures 
now indicate a decline in inequality, the rich still obtain the lion's share 
of the benefits of growth. They acquiesce, therefore, to redistribution of 
relative income rather than cause the downfall of the government which would 
probably occur with stagnation, since redistribution of relative incomes would 
then imply an absolute reduction in their incomes. From this perspective, 
an actual worsening of the relative distribution as measured by percentile or 
Gini indices is a highly "unnatural" phenomenon. 
The logic of this approach is illustrated with Table 4, showing a hypothe-
tical poor country with identical relative inequality of incomes in two periods. 
The real GDPs are $100 in Period 1 and $140 in Period 2. Although the relative 
income position of each quintile of recipients remains unchanged, the first 
quintile has an absolute gain of $20 of real income (half of the benefits of 
growth). The poorest quintile receives only $2 of additional real income 
(5% of the benefits of growth). 
' 
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What can one now say about real countries with very skewed initial 
distributions whose relative distributions actually worsen during growth? 
Or economic growth accompanied by an absolute decline in real income for 
51 
most of their populations, as Adelman and;1>rris found for many LDCs? 
Surely this is not due to such factorsa> increased marginal propen-
sities to save by the elite. Rather, it is evidence of the effects of 
institutional structures and governmental pol:lcies which, intentionally or 
not, enable the economically privileged to appropriate an increased share 
of economic rents and benefits of growth. 
Summary and Conclusions 
The divergence-convergence hypothesis must be regarded as an unconfirmed 
~ hypothesis with little power in explaining inequality in size distributions 
of income. Available historical evidence:fndicates that a gradual decline in 
inequality was experienced in a number of currently developed countries, 
with only one state clearly showing an early phase of increasing inequality. 
The alledged pre-industrial phase characterized by such extreme poverty that 
substantial inequality would be impossible does not appear to have any rele-
vance for the 56 modern nations analyzed inthl.s paper. This is due to the 
simple fact that even the poorest nations often have extremely skewed distri-
butions at present, perhaps more skewed than ever experienced by the developed 
countries. This demonstrates that political, cultural and economic variables 
other than income levels condition a society's income distribution. These 
variables are always present in any society, rather than emerging only after 
a peak of inequality is reached, and they do not necesFarily act to reduce 
inequality. 
~22-
The historical data do not show divergence-convergence to characterize 
the experience of present DCss although it may have occurred in some of them. 
Other patterns probably occurred in several nations, such as "moderate-to-low", 
"L" and "high-to-high'' patterns. In any case, there is no reason to assume 
that the LDCs will repeat the experienceofaly group of DCs except for a time lag. 
Cross-sectional data do not constitute a valid base for generalizations 
about historical processes, although they form the basis for much of the 
divergence-convergence arguments. Moreover,eTen if their applicability is 
incorrectly assumed, a systematic examination of the data does not support 
many of the conclusions drawn from them. No statistically acceptable inverted 
'U' fit can be obtained from them, and 1 ess than one-fifth of the variation 
in inequality is ''explained" by variations in the level of per capita income. 
Rather, the data reveal a tremendous variation in inequality at all income 
levels, greater variation in the LDCs than DCs and a higher average level of 
inequality in the LDCs. 
Given the low explanatory power of the hypothesis, it is not surprising 
that the savings differential and other arguments advanced to explain it also 
prove to have serious theoretical and empirical shortcomings. A number of 
such difficulties are indicated in the text. 
For those countries where increased ~elative) inequality occurs, the 
increased skewness cannot be attributed to growth of per capita income. It 
is necessary to specify the particular type of growth, the institutional 
structures and the governmental policies responsible for such an unfortunate 
situation. 
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APPENDIX 
Statistical tests with cross-sectional data do not demonstrate the 
existence of the hypothesized inverted 'U' pattern, as claimed in two re-
l 
cent publications. The low adjusted coeffieients of determination in 
the associated regressions·do reveal; however, that income levels explain 
very little of the· international variations in inequality, whether measured 
by income shares or Gini indices. 
Besides 'Da Silva's regression with dummy variables (see footnote I! 26), 
there are•two obvious ways of testing the parabolic form suggested in Figure 2: 
(1) 
(2) 
2 Y1 = a + bx1 + cx1 
Y1 = a + bX2 + cX~ 
where: 
Y1 • Gini index 
x1 = GDP per capita 
X2 = log (GDP/capita) 
If an inverted 'U' pattern exists in the data, the coefficient b 
in the regressions should be significantly greater than zero and the 
coefficient c significantly less than zero. Using Paukert's data, 
* the regression estimates are: 
(3) yl .. 0.473 -0.0000278X1 -0.0000000lX~ i 2 = 0.011 (23.4) (-0.56) (-0.34) 
(4) yl -0.66 + 0.92X~ 2 R2 = 0.197 = -0.18X2 
(-1. 96) (3.48 (-3.63) 
* Numbers in parentheses are "t" statistic values. 
' 
' 
' 
appendix, p. 2. 
Equation (4) appears to support the hypothesis, while equation (3) 
appears to contradict it. Actually, both equations are useless for sta-
tistical tests due to the presence of an extreme multicolinearity problem, 
2 
since the simple correlation between X and X is 0.939 and for X and 
1 1 2 
2 
X , r • 0.996. 
2 
In simple terms, near perfect multicolinearity in regressions 
2 
which explain little (low R ) of the variation in the dependent variable 
leads to three situations: 
1) invalid "t 11 tests, resulting from biased coefficient estimates 
(which are simply the numerators of the "t" tests); 
2) estimates which are highly sensitive to the addition or deletion of 
a few observations; and 
3) results extremely dependent on the functional form used. 
As Johnston demonstrates , a high positive correlation between two 
independent variables will probably cause large and opposite errors in 
2 
their coefficients. We observe that near zero "true" values of coefficients 
might be estimated as "large" negative and positive values if the two 
variables are highly correlated. This and situation (3) above are illustrated 
with striking clarity in equations (5-8), using Paukert's data for income 
shares (where Y 
2 
is the income share of the lowest 60% and Y is the share of 
3 
the highest 20% of recipients). 
appendix, p. 3. 
( j) y2 = 0.25 + o.oooo5x1 - o.00000001xf (18.8) (2.08) (-1.57) -2 
R = 0.053 
(6) Y2 = 0.84 - D.47X2 + 0,0'9X~ 
(3 .63) (-2.59) (2. 70) R2 = 0.106 
(7) Y3 = 0.57 - O.OOOlXl + 0.00000002Xf (33.0) (-3.17) (2.50) 
'R2 = 0.143 
(8) Y3 =· -0.09 + '0,53X2 - O.llX~ 
(-0.29) (2.18) (-2,38) 
i 2 = 0.122 
The income shares versions of the inverted 'U' hypothesis (see text) 
predict a 'U' pattern for the share of the lowest 60% and an inverted 
'U' pattern for the share of the highest 20% of recipients. Equations 
6 and 8, respectively, "confirm" these hypotheses. However, if one 
formulates the opposite hypotheses (i.e., an inverted 'U' pattern for 
the lowest 60% and a 'U' pattern for the highest 20%), they are "con-
3 
firmed'by the quadratic equations 5 and 7, respectively. The results 
are thus contradictory regarding the existence of the predicted patterns 
in cross-sectional data. In any case, levels of income are associated 
with very little of the variation in inequality, as seen by the low 
R2 values. 
' 
appendix, p. 4. 
Ahluwalia's statistical "confirmation" of the predicted 'U' pattern 
for the share of the lowest 40% and the inverted 'U' for the share of 
the highest 20% is based on a logarithmic representation of the 
parabolic form with a correlation of 0.996 between x2 and X~ (the 
correlation between x1 and xi for his data is 0.929).4· Results 
similar to that obtained for Paukert's data may be obtained for Ahluwalia's 
estimates when they are substituted in equations (5-8). 
An observation is also in order regarding situation (2) above. Although 
economists often appear to be confident that results will be more satisfactory 
when more data becomes available, this is one case for which little improvement 
~ should be expected, since additional observations are likely to spuriously 
influence the results. The inclusion of a few of the more developed socialist 
countries would tend to support the divergence-convergence hypothesis (the 
studies cited in appendix note 1 already have a few), while the inclusion of 
OPEC countries would tend to detract from the hypothesis even more than pre-
sently available data (placing a series of points in the upper right corner 
of Figure 3). 
Equations (1-8) of course omit variables which influence inequality. 
Adelman and Morris (see text) went beyond regression analysis using 
the AID analyses of variance technique to isolate important variables. 
They did not find income levels to be among the major determinants of 
inequality in cross-sectional data, which is consistent with the present 
analysis. Ahluwalia's model includes additional variables, but contains 
appendix, p. 5. 
serious specification problerns, Hin independent variables, for example, 
i.nclude "share of population with p:rimary education" and "share with 
secondary educaticn." This is an inversion of causality, since mal-
distribution of income leads to maldistribution of education. Simul-
taneous equation models, rather than multiple regression, should be 
used to analyze such relationships. 
Even more important than these considerations is the recognition 
of the limitations o.f cross-sectional data. They are important primarily 
in demonstrating the exi.stence of tremendous diversity in income inequality 
among countries. They slwuld be used with great caution, however, in 
making generalizations about historical phenomena. 
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Ahluwalia, "Income Inequality," pp. 3-37. Calculations and regressions 
are based on data presented on pages 8 and 9 for the income groups indicated. 
Ahluwalia does not present any Gini indicestnr are the income shares data as 
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methods: Rollis Chenery and Moises Syrquin, Patterns of Development, 1950-1970 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1975), pp. 49; 60-63. 
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J. Johnston, Econometric Methods (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 
1972), pp. 160-169. Lawrence R. Klein alsopoints out that if a simple cor-
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appendix, the low "explanatory power" of the independent variables results in 
their simple correlation coefficients exceeding the multiple correlation 
coefficients, often by more than two times. See Klein, An Introduction to 
Econometrics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962), pp. 64; 101. 
3 
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tions with per capita incomes over $1,200 to see if the quadratic estimates 
were more in accord with the divergence-convergence hypothesis. They were 
not. 
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Ahluwalia, "Income Inequality, 11 pp. 8-9. 
Country and Group 
Group 1. Under $100 
1. Tanzania (1964) 
2. Burma (1958) 
3. Chad (1958) 
4. Dahomey (1959) 
5. Nigeria (1959) 
6. Niger (1960) 
7. Madagascar (1960) 
8. India (1956-57) 
9. Sudan (1969) 
Mean Group 1: 
Group Z. $101-200 
10. Pakistan (1963-64) 
11. South Korea (1966) 
12. Bolivia (1968) 
13. Ceylon (1963) 
Table 1. Size Distribution of Personal Income Before Tax in 
56 Countries and Gross Domestic Product cerca 1965. 
GINI 
Index 
0.54 
0.3S 
0.3S 
0.42 
0.51 
0.34 
O.S3 
0.33 
0.40 
0.42 
GDP per 
Head in 
1965 
61 
64 
68 
73 
74 
81 
92 
9S 
97 
78 
Country and Group 
Group 4. $301-500 
29. Costa Rica (1969) 
30. Gabon (1960 
31. Barbados (1951-52) 
32. Surinam (1962) 
33. Lebabon (1955-60) 
34. Mexico (1963) 
3S. Jamaica (1958) 
36. Chile (1968) 
37. Panama (1969) 
Mean Group 4: 
Group 5. $S01-l,OOO 
38. Rep. of S. Africa (196S) 
39. Greece (19S7) 
40. Trinidad & Tobago (57-58) 
41. Argentina (1961) 
14. Sierra Leone (1968) 
0.37 
0.26 
0.53 
0.44 
O,S6 
a.so 
O.S3 
O.S6 
0.47 
101 
107 
132 
140 
142 
180 
187 
192 
148 
42. Japan (1962) 
15. Morocco (1965) 
16. Tunisia (1971) 
17. Senegal (1960) 
Mean Group Z: 
Group 3. $201-300 
18. Ecuador (1968) 
19. Brazil (1960) 
20. Zambia (1959) 
21. Ivory Coast (19S9) 
22. Peru (1961) 
23. Philippines (1961) 
24. El Salvador (196S) 
ZS. Colombia (1964) 
26. Malaya (1957-58) 
27, Iraq (19S6) 
28. Fiji (1968) 
Mean Group 3: 
0.38 
O.S4 
0.48 
0.43 
0.61 
0.48 
O.S3 
0.62 
0.36 
0.60 
0.46 
0.50 
202 
207 
207 
213 
237 
240 
249 
27S 
278 
28S 
29S 
244 
Source: Paukert, "Income Distribution," pp. 114-llS. 
43. Venezuela (1962) 
Kean Group S: 
Group 6. $1001-2,000 
44. Italy (1948) 
4S. Puerto Rico (1963) 
46, Israel (19S7) 
47. Netherlands (1962) 
48, Finland (1962) 
49, United Kingdom (1964) 
SO. Fed. Rep. Germany (1964) 
51. Norway (1963) 
52. France (1962) 
53. Australia (1966-67) 
Kean Group 6: 
Group 7. Over $2001 
54. Denmark (1963) 
55. Sweden (1963) 
56. United States (1969) 
Mean Group 7: 
GIN! 
Index 
a.so 
0.64 
0.45 
0.30 
0.55 
0.53 
0.56 
0.44 
0.48 
0.49 
0.58 
0.38 
0.44 
0.42 
0.39 
0.42 
0.44 
0.40 
0.44 
0.30 
0.42 
0.46 
0.38 
0.45 
0.35 
a.so 
0.30 
0.40 
0.37 
0.39 
0.34 
0,37 
GDP per 
Heacl i;i 
J96S 
360 
368 
368 
424 
440 
441 
46S 
486 
.+90 
427 
S21 
S91 
704 
782 
838 
904 
723 
1,011 
1,101 
1,243 
1,400 
1,568 
1,590 
1,667 
1,717 
1,732 
1,823 
1,485 
2,078 
2,406 
3,233 
2,572 
Table 2. Income Shares and Ranges for Lowest 60% and 
Highest 20% of Recipients for Groups of Nations 
Income Level Lowest 60% of Reci2ients Hishest 20% of Reci2ients 
Mean Share Range Mean Share Range 
(%) (%) (%) (%) 
Less Than $100. 30.1 23.0-36.0 50.5 42. 0-61. 0 
$101-200 25.9 19 .2-41.0 56.5 35.0-65.1 
$201-300 24.1 15,9-33.4 57.7 44.0-68.1 
$301-500 24.7 15.0-37.0 57.4 42.4-71.0 
$501-1000 27.9 16.3-32.6 50.1 46.0-57.4 
' 
$1001-2000 31.1 23.5-53.7 46.6 38.8-53.7 
$2001 and above 33.8 31.4-35 .5 42.7 41.1-44.0 
Source: Paukert, "Income Distribution," pp. 114-115. 
Table 3. Income Shares Received by Lowest Quintile 
of Recipients in Countries with Per Capita 
Incomes of Less than $100 
Country Share of.Lowest Quintile GDP Per Capita 
(% of GDP) (US$) 
1. Tanzania 4.8 61 
2. Burma 10.0 64 
3. Chad 8.0 68 
4. Dahomey 8.0 73 
5. Nigeria 7.0 74 
6. Niger 7.8 81 
7. Madagascar 3.9 92 
8. India 8.0 95 
9. Sudan 5.6 97 
Source: Paukert, "Income Distribution," pp. 114-115. 
in 1965 
Table 4. Growth and Distribution of Real Income in a 
H~:i~othetical LDC 
Quintile Period 1 Period 2 
GDP of % of GDP of GDP of % of GDP of Gain 
Quintile Quintile Quincile Quintile ($) (%) 
1 50 50 (50. 5) 70 50 20 50 
2 20 20 (19.4) 28 20 8 20 
3 15 15 (13.1) 21 15 6 15 
4 10 10 (10.0) 14 10 4 10 
' 
5 5 5 (_2_:.Q) 7 5 2 5 
Total: 100 100 (100.0) 140 100 40 100 
Note: The percentage figures in parentheses are the group means for the 
9 countries with GDP/capita under $100 presented by Paukert, "Income Distribu-
tion," pp. 114-115. All other figures ar hypothetical. 
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FIGURE 2. DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME AT DIFFERENT LEVELS 
OF PER CAPITA GDP 
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Figure 3, Income Inequality at Different Levels of Income 
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Figure 4. 
~ Income Shares of Lowest 60% of Recipients at 
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